Neurofeminism and feminist neurosciences: a critical review of contemporary brain research by Sigrid Schmitz & Grit HÃ¶ppner
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 25 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00546
Neurofeminism and feminist neurosciences: a critical
review of contemporary brain research
Sigrid Schmitz* and Grit Höppner*
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chair of Gender Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Edited by:
Jan Slaby, Freie Universität Berlin,
Germany
Reviewed by:
Melissa Littlefield, University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA
Angela Woods, Durham University,
UK
*Correspondence:
Sigrid Schmitz and Grit Höppner,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chair of
Gender Studies, University of
Vienna, Alserstr. 23/22, 1080
Vienna, Austria
e-mail: sigrid.schmitz@univie.ac.at;
grit.hoeppner@univie.ac.at
To date, feminist approaches to neurosciences have evaluated the debates surrounding
practices of knowledge production within and research results of contemporary brain
research. Consequently, neurofeminist scholars have critically examined gendered impacts
of neuroscientific research. Feminist neuroscientists also develop research approaches
for a more gender-appropriate neuroscientific research on several levels. Based on
neurofeminist critique feminist neuroscientists aim to enrich neuroscientific work by
offering methodological suggestions for a more differentiated setup of categories and
experimental designs, for reflective result presentations and interpretations as well as
for the analysis of result validity. Reframing neuro-epistemologies by including plasticity
concepts works to uncover social influences on the gendered development of the brain and
of behavior. More recently, critical work on contemporary neurocultures has highlighted
the entanglements of neuroscientific research within society and the implications of
‘neurofacts’ for gendered cultural symbolisms, social practices, and power relations. Not
least, neurofeminism critically analyses the portrayal of neuro-knowledge in popular media.
This article presents on overview on neurofeminist debates and on current approaches of
feminist neurosciences. The authors conclude their review by calling for a more gender-
appropriate research approach that takes into account both its situatedness and reflections
on the neuroscientific agenda, but also questions neurofeminist discourse in regards to
uses and misuses of its concepts.
Keywords: feminist neurosciences, neurosexism, neurofeminism, neuro-epistemologies, neurocultures,
neuropedagogy
NEUROSEXISM, NEUROFEMINISM AND FEMINIST
NEUROSCIENCES: A ‘HERSTORICAL’ NARRATIVE
By the middle of the 1980s–and starting with Fausto-Sterling
(1992) book on Myth of Gender at the latest–feminist science
studies have critically examined the knowledge production in the
neurosciences and its impacts in gendered significations, gender
roles and social gender relations.1 Scholars of the humanities, of
the social and cultural studies, and from neuroscience itself have
critically examined theoretical, methodological and methodical
neuroscientific approaches. Scholars of feminist science studies
have elaborated a long-standing critique of neuroscientific empir-
ical research and underlying theoretical concepts, claiming that
they present a seemingly undisturbed history of science and its
actors from a positivist perspective of enlightenment. In this
paper, we present an overview of recent approaches to critically
reflect these problematic narratives in different ways. We will
1This article is a modified version of: Schmitz, S., and Höppner, G. (2014).
“Catching the Brain Today: From Neurofeminism to Gendered Neurocul-
tures,” first published in their edited volume Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist
and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses (Vienna: Zaglossus). The
authors thank their publisher Zaglossus for permission to integrate and
reprint parts of the original article.
present a ‘herstory’ rather than a ‘history’ when referencing the
wide scope of research from colleagues who have evaluated the
findings, methodologies, and processes of knowledge production
in the neurosciences that are all situated within social contexts.
These studies have outlined the gendered constructions within
research as well as the impacts of references to supposed neu-
roscientific “facts of the sexed brain” on various levels. Critical
gender, feminist, and queer scholars have developed a term for
these uncritical biases in research and public perception, and for
their societal impacts on the individual, structural, and symbolic
level: neurosexism (Fine, 2010). Their outstanding scholarly work
has explored such biases in neuroscientific research for more than
three decades now.
As a counterpoint to neurosexism, and following (Bluhm et al.,
2012), we use the term neurofeminism to encompass this work
that evaluates practices of knowledge production within neuro-
science. Neurofeminism critically validates gendered assumptions
of contemporary brain research and examines the impacts of ref-
erences to neuroscientific research on social gendered order and
cultural significations. In consequence, neurofeminism circum-
scribes the analytical perspective for re-evaluating methodological
constraints and knowledge productions within the neurosciences.
Based on a bio-cultural perspective, neurofeminism additionally
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highlights the inseparable entanglements between the develop-
ment of biological matter and social influences.
Neurofeminist scholars not only aim to critically examine
neuroscientific knowledge production but are also engaged in
developing differentiated approaches for a more gender ade-
quate neuroscientific research. The latter approaches, subsumed
as feminist neurosciences, develop assessment tools for multi-
ple participant categorizations (Joel et al., 2013), draft non-
linear experimental designs and processes of data analysis (e.g.,
Dussauge, 2014; Kaiser, 2014) and seek for alternative models
of non-generalized interpretations, which are based upon inter-
sected categories such as gender, ‘race’ and age (e.g., Kuria, 2014).
Feminist neuroscientists generally seek to elaborate the relation
between gender and the brain beyond biological determinism but
still engaging with the materiality of the brain. They aim at a
more differentiated setup of categories and experimental designs,
getting more transparency in the constructive processes of result
presentations and interpretations.
In the following, we outline the approaches and findings of the
NeuroGender Network (in Section The NeuroGender Network),
an expert group that has been founded in 2010 within the scope of
neurofeminist agenda. We then elaborate our ‘herstory’ in Section
Concepts, Knowledge Productions, and Reflective Approaches of
Feminist Neurosciences by summarizing findings of recent critical
research on sex/gender and the brain. We incorporate different
perspectives of neuroscientific epistemologies that highlight plas-
ticity concepts in particular in order to gain a more differentiated
view on brain-behavior development in gendered socio-cultural
experiences and contexts. In Section Neuro-epistemologies, Neu-
rocultures and Their Impacts, we focus on current neurocultural
discourses, their references to neuroscience and, vice versa, the
impacts of neuroscientific knowledge production on gendered
social power relations. Finally, we also question the neurofeminist
discourse in regards to uses and misuses of its concepts. To point
to the narrative structures of ‘neuroscientific stories’ we decided
to put terms that—in our view—embed constructive meanings
in single quotation marks, though these terms may be treated as
‘facts’ in scientific and popular debates. This format may irritate
the reader, but the irritation is deliberate.
THE NEUROGENDER NETWORK
In March 2010, the Center for Gender Research at Uppsala
University, and Isabelle Dussauge and Anelis Kaiser in particular,
launched the first international and transdisciplinary NeuroGen-
derings conference in order to make available a platform for
the exchange between scholars of neurofeminism. This confer-
ence was funded by the Swedish Research Council, as part of
the excellence program GenNa: Nature/Culture and Transgressive
Encounters, and by the Body/Embodiment Group at the Center
for Gender Research.2 At this meeting, the NeuroGenderings
Network3 was initiated. Scholars from Europe, the United States,
Canada, and Australia represent a broad range of disciplines
2http://www.genna.gender.uu.se/themes/bodyembodiment/
3The following members launched the NeuroGenderings Network: Isabelle
Dussauge (Linköping University), Cordelia Fine (University of Melbourne),
Hannah Fitsch (Technical University Berlin), Katarina Hamberg (Umeå
University), Rebecca Jordan-Young (Columbia University), Anelis Kaiser
such as neuroscience, the humanities, social and cultural studies,
gender and queer studies, feminist science studies, and science
and technology studies. They all research a variety of issues in
the field of gender and the brain, evaluate the current state
of neuroscientific methods, findings, representations, and inter-
pretations of empirical brain research (neurofeminism), initiate
dialogue across disciplinary borders, and develop detailed and
enriched approaches for neuroscientific analyses themselves (fem-
inist neuroscience). Moreover, the NeuroGender Group aims to
develop concepts for more reflective debates in education and
in all social spheres (an approach we call neuropedagogies). The
NeuroGenderings Expert Group published its first results in a
special issue of the journal Neuroethics, entitled “Neuroethics and
Gender” (for an overview, see Dussauge and Kaiser, 2012b).
The network grew after its second conference, entitled
‘NeuroCultures—NeuroGenderings II’, which was held at the
University of Vienna from 13–15 September, 2012.4 The Neuro-
Gender experts discussed the impacts of neuroscientific research
on gender constructions in socio-political and cultural fields and–
vice versa–analyzed the social and political underpinnings of the
ongoing cerebralization of human life. The recently published
volume Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives
on Current Brain Discourses (Schmitz and Höppner, 2014) brings
together differentiated analyses of scientific knowledge produc-
tion focusing on sex, gender, and the brain and offers insight into
gendered norms that frame current neurocultures. It also demon-
strates how some of these norms could possibly be transformed
while revealing how others persist in scientific and popular dis-
course. The volume, finally, presents novel concepts for incor-
porating gender-appropriate neuro-pedagogies in teaching and
social discourse.
The NeuroGender Expert Group is in itself not homogeneous,
neither in its disciplinary connection to the field, its perspective
on neurosciences and current neurocultures nor concerning the
theoretical assumptions and conclusions about these issues. In
consequence, though ‘our’ knowledge production (as all scientific
knowledge productions) has some common lines, others are more
controversial (Kraus, 2012b). The NeuroGenderings III confer-
ence, May 8–10, 2014 in Lausanne (Switzerland),5 organized
by Cynthia Kraus and Anelis Kaiser, highlighted the different
standpoints in the debate, and the discussion proceeds.
CONCEPTS, KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTIONS, AND REFLECTIVE
APPROACHES OF FEMINIST NEUROSCIENCES
Neuroscience is currently a key area of research regarding the
question of what constitutes the human (for overview, see
Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). With its modern methods of brain
(University of Bern), Cynthia Kraus (Lausanne University), Emily Ngubia
Kuria (Charité Berlin), Katrin Nikoleyczik (University of Freiburg), Deboleena
Roy (Emory University), Raffaela Rumiati (International School for Advanced
Studies of Trieste), Sigrid Schmitz (University of Vienna), and Catherine Vidal
(Institute Pasteur Paris).
4For a complete list comprised of over 40 experts who form the current
broader NeuroGenderings Network from inter- and transdisciplinary perspec-
tives see: http://neurocultures2012.univie.ac.at/
5The program of this ‘dissensus’ conference is available at
http://www3.unil.ch/wpmu/neurogenderings3/
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imaging and thus the apparent ability to see into the living brain
at work, structures and activity networks appear to be precisely
localizable (e.g., Rose, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2012). Until today, neu-
rosciences and even more popular science media (cf. Joyce, 2005)
take behavior, thinking, and acting often as being explainable
and even predictable via these biological materialities. Particularly
neurodeterminist notions of a ‘sexed brain’ are being transported
into public discourse (e.g., Pease and Pease, 2004; Cahill, 2005;
Brizendine, 2007, 2011; Gray, 2012) without reflecting the biases
in empirical work.
The basic assumption of two sexes is the premise for applying
difference-oriented methods in brain research, through which
each group is assumed to be inherently homogenous. How-
ever, the outcome of research on differences between women
and men in terms of linguistic abilities, spatial orientation, or
mathematics—that is, of cognitive capacities in general—is by
no means conclusive (Schmitz, 1999; Coluccia and Louse, 2004;
Spelke, 2005; Mehl et al., 2007; Else-Quest et al., 2010; Lavenex
and Lavenex, 2010; Fausto-Sterling et al., 2012a,b); neither are
results on emotional or rational processing (Karafyllis, 2008), nor
is the state of the art on brain basics for sexual orientation and
desire. The influence of heteronormative notions of sexual orien-
tation and desire to sex/gender determinism has been impressively
shown, for example, by Dussauge and Kaiser (2012a).
In meta-analytic reviews, Janet Hyde emphasized more behav-
ioral similarities than differences between women and men
(Hyde, 2005), gender similarities have been shown impressively
concerning math performance (Hyde and Linn, 2006; Hyde
et al., 2008). Feminist neuroscientists have uncovered inconsistent
findings concerning sex differences and elaborated similarities
between or variations within the gender groups, not only on
the level of behavior and performance but also concerning their
apparently biological sources, i.e., the brain networks and their
functions (Frost et al., 1999; Blanch et al., 2004; Ulshöfer, 2008;
Wallentin, 2009; Jordan-Young, 2010; Bluhm et al., 2012; Jordan-
Young and Rumiati, 2012; Kuria, 2012; Roy, 2012; Vidal, 2012;
Dussauge, 2014; Kaiser, 2014; Sommer et al., 2004, 2008).
Approaches questioning the boundaries between sex and gen-
der prompted us to use the term sex/gender in reference to
analyses of neuroscientific research. According to feminist sci-
ence studies, sex is not a purely physical or material fact but is
deeply interwoven with social and cultural constructions (Fausto-
Sterling, 2012). Following this concept, the term sex/gender (first
applied to the neuroscientific context by Kaiser et al. (2009)
is deliberately used throughout this paper to emphasize the
inextricable entanglements of both categories in a bio-cultural
approach. Recently, the importance of including intersected cat-
egories into neuroscientific research has been highlighted (e.g.,
Kaiser, 2012; Hyde, 2014). Intersectional perspectives help to out-
line the entanglements of categories in neuroscientific research,
for example, when racism and ageism are connected with gen-
der. Kuria (2014) elaborates how ‘race’/ism is implemented in
empirical neuroscientific knowledge production on sex/gender.
In her analysis, she uses a medical history perspective and the
psychoanalytical work of Grada Kilomba to expose the processes
of knowledge production as an “act of decolonizing knowledge”
(p. 110). Not only does Kuria show the relevance of integrating
‘race’ as an analytical category when analyzing neuroscientific
work and its inherent gender differences, moreover she reminds
the NeuroGender network itself to reflect on its own ‘white’
norms as aspects that call for critical analysis. Taking a focus
on current brain-imaging research of facial affect, Gumy (2014)
elaborates intersections of age and gender. She evaluates which
fMRI tools allow a significant difference to be seen in brain
activation between adolescents and adults. Gumy argues that
current concepts of the “cerebralization of adolescence” (p. 258)
itself produce differences between boys and girls as neuroscientific
scholars never understood the brain as being unisex but rather
pre-defined it as male-connoted. In consequence, as Gumy argues,
sex/gender is acting performatively in the construction of the
‘adolescent brain’ on various levels. By presenting neurofeminist
empirical critiques and aiming for a more gender-appropriate
research, these approaches focus on important methodological
aspects and biases in the construction of sex/gender, ‘race’ and
age in brain research.
Differentiated analyses systematically investigated methodical
influences on neuroscientific knowledge production in sex/gender
research. Scholars such as Bishop and Wahlstein (1997), Fine
(2013), Kaiser et al. (2009) and Schmitz (2010) have uncovered
variations in data selection, statistical analyses, and computer
tomographic calculations that contradict generalizations being
made throughout various studies. The fact that these meta-studies
have been included in scholarly neuroscience journals attests an
increasing sensitization towards critical reflections on methods
within brain analyses. Nonetheless, even now, studies that estab-
lish differences between sex/gender are published more often than
studies that do not find differences (Kaiser, 2012; Fine, 2013).
Although the reasons of such ‘publication biases’ may be manifold
(e.g., caused by the emphasis for getting research funding within
the sciences or due to catching the interests of the public target
groups in popular press), they still manifest notions of a binary
gender order and foster the persistence of seemingly biologically
determined gendered significations. Even more rigid gendered
stereotypes endure, particularly when it comes to the trans-
gression of ‘scientific knowledge’ into the public discourse and
when addressing social issues within popular media. For example,
recent in-depth analyses have evaluated the scope of neuroscien-
tific knowledge and examined the media discourse surrounding
the debates on the function and transformation of the hormone
oxytocin. In French media, oxytocin was recently referred to as a
‘maternal’ hormone (Fillod, 2014) or, in public discourse, even as
the ‘cuddle’ hormone. Though oxytocin has always been regarded
as a female hormone, it began being treated as the biological basis
for pair bonding and trust (Matusall, 2014), despite the fact that
there are no neuroscientific findings to support this claim. Odile
Fillod and Svenja Matusall showed how media articles selectively
choose the one or the other ‘scientific fact’ (without reflecting on
the inconsistencies and the lack of valid findings) to legitimate
social gender relations of ‘motherhood’.
Brain images of brilliantly colored activation areas present
local distinctions and precise areas of processing in line with
behavioral and cognitive performances. These visualizations are
often taken as evidence of what is inside (or outside) of the
brain (McCabe and Castel, 2008). They serve as a metaphoric
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concept of science that proposes discovering and representing
‘nature as it is’. Beside an abundance of critical analyses on
the processes of brain image constructions (Beaulieu, 2002;
Gallagher, 2011; Fitsch, 2012; for an overview, see Choudhury
and Slaby, 2011), nevertheless, neuroscientists are well aware of
both the constructive nature of these images (Beaulieu, 2001;
Joyce, 2005) and the mutual biases in neuroscientific research
(Vul et al., 2009; Henrich et al., 2010). Brain images are by
no means direct portrayals of the interior of the brain. The
transformation from corporeal matter to non-corporeal data and
conversion back to an image of a brain’s matter (Schmitz, 2003)
is certainly not unprecedented. In terms of laboratory studies,
particular “inscriptions” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) are well in
line with constructive processes of brain imaging. In consequence,
brain image construction always depends on the context in and
on the decisions with which the images are produced. These
decisions depend, for example, on the theoretical approach of
the analysis, on the methods applied during the experiment,
on negotiation processes within a lab, on research aims, or on
the conscious and unconscious understandings and beliefs of
researchers, to name only a few intervening factors (e.g., Beaulieu,
2001). However, this is not to say that knowledge of the brain
that has been gained through image technology is random or
inapplicable. On the contrary, and especially for biomedicine,
ways of constructing knowledge through specialized procedures
are useful for different diagnostic fields, therapy, or neurosurgery.
Nevertheless, brain-imaging procedures are still constructions
with particular aims and functions, highlighting the one brain
area or the other vessel structure, subtracting one activity from
another.
The analyses of critical neuroscience are also of importance
for reflective approaches to the gendering of brain images.
Recent analyses have shown that due to the selection of cal-
culation processes gender differences or a lack of those differ-
ences can appear in images of the same experimental group
(Kaiser et al., 2007; Fitsch, 2012, 2014; Nikoleyczik, 2012; Mai-
bom and Bluhm, 2014). As brain images that are presented
in scientific papers include the decisions made by researchers
and research groups while computing an image, these studies
should include transparency of their categories and calculation
processes in data analysis. The use of brain images becomes
problematic if they are presented out of context in order to
make generalizing statements about predefined groups based on
gender, age, ethnicity, or other universalized categories (Schmitz,
2010; Gumy, 2014; Kaiser, 2014; Kuria, 2014). It turns out to
be even more problematic if brain images are used in popular
science publications (in popular media as well as in popular
books) to transport simplified statements about group differ-
ences in brain and behavior or even predictions about further
behavior of seemingly homogenized groups (e.g., Pease and
Pease, 2004; Cahill, 2005; Brizendine, 2007, 2011; Gray, 2012).
Scholars from neurofeminism have elaborated the transgression
processes of apparent biological explanations that are taken for
granted and are transformed in public discourse to confirm
supposedly rigid sex differences—irrespective of whether gen-
der differences are constituted in gendered social orders or not
(Vidal and Benoit-Browaeys, 2005; Vidal, 2005, 2012; Fillod,
2014; Jordan-Young, 2014). These analyses also show how the
newest scientific findings are referenced in order to serve the
legitimization of social hierarchies, inclusions, and exclusions
(Höppner and Schmitz, 2014; O’Connell, 2014).
Finally, and with respect to the conceptual background of neu-
roscientific research, a differentiated understanding of sex/gender
and the brain was developed in the context of plasticity concepts
in the neurosciences, the history of which spans more than
50 years, beginning with the first notions of structural changes
in synaptic connections, developed in animal studies in the 1960s
(Rosenzweig et al., 1962). Findings from animal studies led to the
conclusion that the processing of environmental stimuli already
prenatally effects the development, decomposition, and alteration
of synapses between neurons. Learning experience stabilizes and
destabilizes the central nervous network along its situatedness
in a particular environmental context to which it is supposed
(Hubel and Wiesel, 1970). The concept of brain plasticity points
out that brain structures and brain functions are not in any
shape or form determined by evolution or remain unchanged
during a life span. At birth, the brain is not at all branded or
defined, and this network of nerve cells, neuronal fibers and
their synapses is not ‘completely formed’ by genetic information.
As Vidal (2012, p. 297) puts it: “The human brain is made
up of 100 billion neurons and 1 million billion synapses which
are the junctions between neurons, while there are only 6000
genes involved in the nervous system. This means that there
are not enough genes to control the building of our billions of
synapses”.
This concept of brain plasticity and the brain’s ability to
adapt to its environmental influences applies to all areas of the
brain, but outstanding to the most complex networks of the
cortex. As a result, neuronal networks ‘learn’ repetitive patterns
of information and embody them structurally and functionally.
Neuroplasticity studies in the 1980s and 1990s have pointed to
the adaptive potential of sensory and motor areas in primates
(e.g., Jenkins and Merzenich, 1987; Kaas et al., 1990) and in
the last decades plasticity in the human cortex is in the cen-
ter of a whole scope of analyses (see below). Environmentally
influenced neural and synaptic plasticity, down to physiological
regulations and gene expression (for an overview, see Kandel
et al., 2000), are taken as the cellular and molecular basics for
learning principles in the central nervous system. The alteration
of neuronal networks is a lifelong process, which occurs through
experience and with every learning activity. Brain plasticity is
not only the basis for learning over the entire lifetime, but is
also necessary for brain functions. The tremendous dynamic
‘nature’ of brain plasticity, particularly in humans, this constant
interplay between the outside environment and biological struc-
ture, is considered as a decisive advantage for human cognitive
abilities.
Today, brain plasticity studies in humans address the devel-
opment of different language networks and brain functionalities
in line with individual language biographies (Bloch et al., 2009),
changes in spatial and motoric areas correlated to long-term nav-
igation experience (Maguire et al., 2000) or structural changes in
the corpus callosum (e.g., Gaser and Schlaug, 2003) and motoric
brain networks following shorter periods of learning juggling
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(Draganski et al., 2004). Plasticity concepts have therefore led to
a redefinition of cause and effect in ‘neuro-argumentations’, as
the biological system of the brain is extremely open and able to
adapt diverse influences over the course of a lifetime. From this
constructivist perspective, the brain cannot be characterized as
solely physical matter and as the only essence of behavior. It must
be analyzed in regards to its continuous entanglements with the
outer world. Cultural and social experiences influence behavior
by forming and shaping the biology of the brain. Recent studies
on how the experience with virtual games diminishes sex/gender
differences are indicative of the necessity of these constructions of
competences (Feng et al., 2007), for which brain studies have also
argued (Jordan-Young, 2010). During the last decade, neurofem-
inist scholars more and more used the perspective of plasticity to
analyze the material-discursive entanglements of brains and their
environments (Schmitz, 2010; Jordan-Young and Rumiati, 2012;
Vidal, 2012).
Accordingly, brain images are snapshots of a certain moment
of physical materiality, which is always connected to individual
biographies. Results of brain scans can thus not provide informa-
tion on the processes that led to these developments, neither from
nature nor from culture. Despite this obvious critique, the “snap-
shot approach” is mostly used in place of plasticity considerations
for the interpretation of results (Schmitz, 2010), and it persists
even in recent sex/gender-related brain imaging studies, as Fine
(2013) has analyzed.
Neurofeminist analyses also investigate the stereotype thread
and its consequences. The overtaking of gendered stereotypes into
self-schemata impacts cognitive performance, behavior, and even
neuronal processes (Spencer et al., 1999; Massa et al., 2005; for
an overview, see also Fine, 2010). Taking the example of spatial
orientation, a prominent issue when it comes to determining sex
differences in behavior, the mutual influences on the development
of cognitive strategies have already been elaborated (Schmitz,
1997, 1999) and their impacts on brain development have been
discussed intensively (Fine, 2010; Jordan-Young, 2010).
In sum, neurofeminism has developed a theoretical and
methodological agenda to critically review neuroscientific
knowledge production concerning sex/gender aspects.
Differentiated analyses help to foreground diversities and
dynamic processes in place of binary gender categories (for
an overview, see the collection on Neurofeminism: Issues at the
Intersection of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science edited
by Bluhm et al., 2012, the special issue on Neuroscience and
Sex/Gender edited by Dussauge and Kaiser, 2012b, and the
anthology on Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer
Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses edited by Schmitz and
Höppner, 2014). Scholars of the NeuroGenderings Network,
however, aim for more than only critical evaluation of existing
research. From feminist and queer perspectives, they reflect the
influences of gendered and intersected norms and values in
brain research and brain imaging procedures and, conversely,
research the impacts of neuroscientific knowledge production on
processes of normalization (Dussauge, 2014; Fitsch, 2014; Kaiser,
2014; Kuria, 2014). Moreover, feminist neuroscientists aim to
enrich neuroscientific research by considering perspectives, which
have found only less attention in such approaches up to date, for
example, the development of assessment tolls for the multiple
dimensions of participant categorizations (Joel et al., 2013).
NEURO-EPISTEMOLOGIES, NEUROCULTURES AND THEIR
IMPACTS
The brain plasticity concept is important for deconstructing
unilinear statements about a supposedly biological determination
of behavior, attitudes, etc. In narrating plasticity stories, neuro-
feminist scholars mainly stress a return of genealogies of cause
and effect, arguing that gendered social experiences and power
relations impact the forming of the gendered brain’s structure and
function more than vice versa (e.g., Vidal, 2012). But the use of the
brain plasticity concept—albeit extremely useful for pointing out
the inscription and embodiment of individual experiences, social
structures, and cultural norms—also challenges neurofeminist
discourse in two ways. Firstly, brain plasticity analyses follow
an account that refers to the discursive forming of materiality
and thus emphasize the meaning-making processes inscribed in
the brain (Schmitz, 2014a). By pointing solely in this direction,
they do not take into account the brain’s agency. With reference
to plasticity concepts, the materiality of the brain remains to
be framed as a more or less passive reactor to the attribution
of gendered (and intersected) significations. The perspective of
a feminist materialist approach (e.g., Barad, 2003; Alaimo and
Hekman, 2008; Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012) points to
brain plasticity rather as an intra-active phenomenon. In terms
of Karen Barad’s onto-epistemological framework, this perspec-
tive particularly addresses the dynamic processes that constitute
‘real’ world phenomena between material and meaning-making
(discursive) components (Barad, 2007). Based on this framing,
neuro-materiality can be discussed in terms of culture, society,
cognition, and behavior, which all give meaning to each other
in developmental processes of enacting and intra-acting. If brain
and culture are understood as being indivisibly intertwined in an
assemblage of reciprocal exchange, constituting and continuously
re-shaping each other, then the phenomenon of the ‘brain-body-
in-culture’ not only passively awaits its shaping and forming
from the outside world. Hence, the disclosure of the impartible
entanglements of brain, bodies, mind, behavior, socio-cultural
contexts, and meaning-making serves as an inspiration for neuro-
feminist debates. Wilson (1998) already started employing these
approaches in Neural Geographies and scholars from the Neuro-
Gender Network have recently called for addressing the brain’s
agency in a non-essentialist manner (Dussauge and Kaiser, 2012a;
Kraus, 2012a; Schmitz, 2014a).
In consequence, differentiated approaches to gender issues
in neuroscience also have to take into account the dynamic
constitutions of the brain sex/gender network, embedded in bio-
logical, psychosocial, and sociocultural intra-actions. By debat-
ing concepts of current brain research and by theoretically and
empirically discussing their consequences (e.g., Fine, 2012; Joel,
2014; Maibom and Bluhm, 2014; Pitts-Taylor, 2014; Roy, 2014),
a reframing of neuro-epistemologies should allow for questions
as to how concepts (even one’s own) and discourses can be
read against the backdrop of the feminist debate surrounding
materialism (Schmitz, 2014a,b,c). Do neurofeminist concepts
grasp corporeal materiality beyond essentialist determinism and
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ontological entities? To what extent do these concepts take the
conscious and non-conscious agency of materiality seriously? Do
they consider the entanglements and the intra-acting material-
discursive components that mark each other by ascribing mean-
ing to materiality within a particular context? Additionally, does
scientific and popular discourse question the hybrid concep-
tions of brain-bodies-in-cultures in terms of their potentials
for disrupting nature–culture dichotomies on both material and
epistemological levels? Or do the limitations and dichotomist
conceptions continue to prevail? Last but not least, does the fem-
inist materialist framework, which highlights the mutual intra-
actions of neuro-cultural phenomena in particular, cover all the
important aspects in this discourse or does it also challenge the
feminist self-conception of political science (a ‘dissensus’ question
to which we will refer in the last section of this paper)?
Secondly, merely turning around the cause–effect genealogy
does not prevent the use of essentialist concepts. The knowledge
production and scientific framework that are elaborated in the
field of the neurosciences both form the reference point for a wide
scope of other disciplines and contemporary academic discourses
(cf. Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). Not only science and psychol-
ogy but also education, economics, sociology, the humanities, and
philosophy refer to the results of brain research to explain their
concepts of societal processes. They all treat the individual as a
“cerebral subject” (Ortega and Vidal, 2007)—the anthropological
figure of the human according to which the brain constitutes
the self. Current neurocultures comprise the conceptions of how
thought, behavior, subjectivity, and identity should correspond to
the brain’s biology and one could thus go so far as to claim that
neurocultures represent a new paradigm—for research as well as
for social discourse.
Neurocultures are based on the development of an all-
explanatory epistemology of the brain (Koslow, 2000), an
endeavor that started in the 1990s with the “Decade of the
Brain” and the first “Human Brain Project” (OHBM, 2001). This
research agenda was sponsored by the US National Academy of
Health during George W. Bush’s presidency, and is currently being
followed up by the new U.S. BRAIN Initiative,6 the EU-based
“Human Brain Project”7 and the Swiss “Blue Brain Project”.8
The latter project is particularly geared toward building an arti-
ficial brain computer. The wordings of these projects are full of
metaphoric pictures: “adventure”, “discovery”, “enlightenment”.
They thus follow, once again, a metaphysical approach to science,
reaching out for an all-explaining knowledge framework with
which to explain ‘the human’ (including and referring also to ani-
mal studies). This framework is reminiscent of the ‘promises’ of
bio-technologies that Donna Haraway already elaborated decades
ago (Haraway, 1992). These developments recall the need for a
critical approach to researching and uncovering the impacts of
neurocultural references that legitimize social structures and even
gendered relations: especially the fact that political interventions
are also legitimized using these references should inspire critical
6http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/02/fact-sheet-brain-
initiative
7https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/discover/the-project/overview
8http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/cms/lang/en/pid/56882
neurogender analyses. Schmitz, for example, has analyzed the
specific argumentation of “modern neurodeterminism”, a crucial
aspect within these debates. Modern neurodeterminism does not
care whether brain structures and functions are innate or formed
by experience, considering it to be irrelevant whether the indi-
vidual brain is formed by nature or nurture. Nevertheless, these
paradigms remain based on essentialist concepts of the brain.
Brain materiality and functionality are believed to be essential
for explaining and even predicting the outcome of behavior at
the moment of measurement (for a detailed development of this
concept see Schmitz, 2012).
There is an interesting ambivalence that is not articulated
in current neurocultural discourse: while plasticity concepts are
included in modern neurodeterminism up to the moment of
measuring, they are dropped again when it comes to predicting
future behavior. Although insisting on the forming of biological
materiality from ‘outside’, neurocultural discourse is in danger
of remaining connected to concepts that presume to predict
behavior, thinking, and acting due to biological entities from
‘inside’. The impacts of these normative framings on cultural
understandings, social practices, and governmental discourses are
already the subject of critical analyses (Choudhury et al., 2009;
Choudhury and Slaby, 2011). Neurofeminism must question the
gender-based and intersected legitimations that are drawn from
neurocultural discourse and practices, in particular because neu-
roscientific knowledge production can be used for various socio-
political in- and exclusions (O’Connell, 2014).
One example of a critical examination of neurocultures is
Höppner and Schmitz (2014) analysis which pursues the question
of how the phenomenon of neuropharmacological enhancement
is discussed in the German media. The analysis of 21 public
media articles (published between 2006 and 2011 in four German
online journals) shows that self-optimization of the brain with
the help of neuropharmaceuticals is increasingly predicted as a
universal strategy for success. Whereas success-oriented males
tend to aim for the improvement of their rational skills, success-
oriented-women should focus on regulating their self-confidence.
Moreover, the articles once again manifest a hierarchized status
quo of rational skills over emotional capacities and a differ-
ent proficiency level that neuro-enhanced subjects could achieve
depending on their gender. While women would need a continual
consumption of neuro-enhancers in order to achieve a proficiency
level similar to male capacities for a limited time, men should take
neuro-enhancers only once a while to selectively enhance their
supposedly high capacities (a result of their biological setup) to
become the best within the group of the best men. In contrast, a
continual consumption of Ritalin by women is shaped as resulting
in distress and negative reactions from the social environment.
This analysis illustrates that the paradigm of pharmacological
neuroenhancement is not free of gendered implications in a
success-oriented society but rather reproduces biologist signifi-
cations of women and men. Within the current popular debate,
what stands out in particular is the paradigm of individualization
and self-responsibility in neoliberal society. Equal opportunities
qua the optimization of brains are addressed in the sense of
‘everyone is his/her own fortune’. This falls in line with a disregard
for social structures that perpetuate gendered discriminations on
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the labor market. Central to this logic is the individualization of
deficiency concepts and the call for self-responsibility to improve
one’s own brain for seemingly personal needs, instead of fighting
social causes of gender inequality. The possibility of achieving
equality appears as a solely neutral endeavor.
In the modern meritocracy, the plastic brain is used as the
starting point for modulating and optimizing human behavior
(Maasen and Sutter, 2007; Pitts-Taylor, 2010). Understanding
the brain as an instrument that is open for manipulation and
modulation, which should be enhanced by using the most diverse
technologies, these neuro-optimizations intervene in the body
on a profound level and thus co-constitute the cerebral subject
(Schmitz, 2012). Brain vocabulary produces a culturally and
historically specific version of the human being and, as such,
impacts individual, social, cultural, and political spheres. As
education, social, and cultural studies as well as philosophical
disciplines refer to the results of brain research and turn the brain
into the central category of the cerebral subject, definitions of
the self, social processes, or the idea of a future humanity are
debated in terms of neuro-argumentation (Vidal, 2009). Neuro-
argumentation emerges as the central figure in configurations
of the “politics of life itself ” (Rose, 2007), in the emergence of
neuro-governmentalities (Rose, 2005; Maloni, 2010; Rose and
Rose, 2013), in new framings of biological citizenship (Rose
and Novas, 2005) and in the “management of the mind” (Rose
and Abi-Rached, 2013). It should be an urgent task for gender
and neurofeminist research to reassess and reflect upon these
conceptions (Schaper-Rinkel, 2012). How are the concepts of
brain plasticity taken up in times of neoliberalism and how do
they affect the connected neuroscientific discourses on gendered
concepts (Pickersgill, 2013; Höppner and Schmitz, 2014; Schmitz,
2014b)? Do these new concepts carry emancipatory potential for
gendered positions and possibilities of action, or (how) do they
retransmit gender binaries and boundaries?
Last but not least, and following the goal of improving neuro-
scientific knowledge production, it is necessary to reflect both the
scientific concepts/methodologies and the transfer of neuroscien-
tific ‘findings’ into the public debate (Vidal, 2005), in particular in
the process of teaching and learning. Since gendered conceptions
and connotations shape individual actions, social practices, and
social segregation, gender-sensitive analyses can help to assess the
entanglements within and the outcomes of neuro-pedagogies in
medial discourse, schools, and universities. More precisely, such
approaches outline the interdependencies of bodily materiality,
social experiences, and cultural norms by underpinning the alter-
ability and interdependencies of brains, behavior, thinking, and
acting throughout a person’s lifetime. In doing so, they suggest
alternative concepts and settings for individual learning processes
(e.g., Vidal, 2012; Just, 2014; Mead Vetter, 2014).
FEMINIST NEUROSCIENCES: AN OUTLOOK—OR EVEN A
CALL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Neurofeminist analyses have outlined permanent gender codes in
society and in research, such as masculinity, rationality, power,
status as subject, to the side of culture, which are contrasted
with femininity, emotionality, reproduction, status as object, to
the side of nature. The understanding of ‘rationality’ and ‘emo-
tionality’ as gendered material-semiotic nodes (to introduce a
term from Haraway (1988)) turns out to be more useful when
accounting for their bio-cultural entanglements. In contrast to
the prominent and long-standing search for dichotomous dif-
ferences between women and men, analyses of contextualized
differences could be more effective and adequate for realizing
gender equity.
Interdisciplinary neurofeminist research on sex/gender neu-
roscientific knowledge production and on its impacts in cur-
rent neurocultures should prospectively consider the following
aspects: the empirical significance of neuroscientific research, the
close entanglements of neuroscientific research with society, and
the impacts of ‘neurofacts’ (in the broadest sense) on gendered
and intersected cultural symbolisms, social practices, and power
relations. Since the embedding of constructive paradigms of
‘neuro-matter-in-society’ is taken as a basis for recent devel-
opments surrounding the optimized human within neoliberal
framings, the outcomes, vulnerabilities, and power relations of
these developments have to be at the core of future discourses on
gendered neurocultures (Schmitz, 2014a).
What could these claims mean for critical brain research? The
incorporation of ‘dissensus’ questions, as Cynthia Kraus (2012b)
suggests, is an important basis for discussing and researching
in times of powerful recourses to ‘the neuro’, both in scholarly
and public discourse. Although dissensus can be extremely pro-
ductive for interdisciplinary debates on brain research, Rebecca
Jordan-Young (2014) decodes disciplinary language as one rea-
son for the dissensus among neurofeminist scholars. That is,
shifting definitions of terms from one discipline to another is
fruitful but also bears the danger of misconceptions. A sensi-
tive rereading and negotiation of such conceptual shifts may
prevent misleading interpretations. Additionally, scholarly neu-
rofeminism has to further reflect both the use and misuse
of its own concepts and how to ask research questions in a
study. Based on an “ethic of knowing”, Barad (1996, p. 183)
points to a reflection of one’s own research processes because
“our constructed knowledges have real material consequences”.
Reflective neuroscientific approaches should consider both the
situatedness of analyses and the question to what extent schol-
ars’ disciplinary, class, ‘race’, national, and gendered history
influence their studies. To what extent are we able to iden-
tify the power relations that co-constitute our brains, which in
turn influence our research? Based on this individual geneal-
ogy, do neurofeminist scholars working on gendered impacts
confirm or transform gendered norms and orders through their
research?
Finally, the debate on gender-appropriate research must not
only take into account neuroscientific knowledge production but
also the transformation of neuroscientific ‘facts’ into the public
via popular media and pedagogy. Such gendered neurocultures
are by no means an exclusive product of separate actors but a
result of the entanglements of a multitude of discourses, norms,
practices, materialities, and structures that co-constitute each
other. In order to rethink brain research today, it is thus all the
more important to reflect on these processes in a more detailed
manner.
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